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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research on risk perception suggests that individual neglect of disasters is likely due to 
an inability to process information about low-probability, high-consequence threats and moral 
hazard.
(3)
 As a result, it is important to study the quality of organizational responses to disasters, 
since they may be crucial to compensating for the frailty of individual choice. Preliminary 
evidence suggests that an organizational risk manager is important in disaster planning,
(4)
 but 
there is no empirical evidence (to our knowledge) that having a designated risk manager leads to 
the adoption of risk-reducing measures in organizations. Additionally, there is limited research 
on the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of risk-reducing measures at the 
organizational level. The goal of this study is to empirically answer two questions. (1) “Does 
having a risk manager in an organization predict the adoption of risk-reducing measures?” (2) 
“What is the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of risk-reducing measures at 
the organizational level?” Using data collected from a sample of public, private, and non-profit 
organizations in the Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee in 2006, we find that organizations 
with risk managers adopted more risk-reducing measures than organizations without risk 
managers and that risk perception is a significant predictor of risk-reducing measures. This study 
builds on a small, but growing literature on how organizations perceive risks and respond to 
them.
(8-13)
  
 
KEY WORDS: Organizational risk perception; risk manager; mitigation and preparedness 
measures; hazards; disasters 
 
 
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
The colossal nature of disaster-induced losses is, indeed, worrisome as the annual losses, 
measured globally, and the number of victims of disasters continue to increase each year.
(1, 2)
 For 
instance, in 2011, disasters worldwide killed 30,773 people and caused an unprecedented $366.1 
billion in economic losses.
(2)
 With regard to the number of disaster victims, in 2011, the number 
of disaster victims (244.7 million) surpassed the 2001 to 2010 average of 232 million.
(2)
 In light 
of the magnitude and persistent increases in disaster losses, there is a pressing need to study 
ways of stemming disaster losses. Although it is difficult or impossible to change the magnitude 
and frequency of disasters, mitigation and preparedness activities can help ameliorate disaster 
impacts.  
Natural and man-made disasters (e.g., earthquakes and chemical spills) can lead to 
concentrated harm in a localized area where organizations are potentially impacted. Previous 
research suggests that neglect of disasters by individuals is likely due to an inability to process 
information about low-probability, high-consequence threats and moral hazards.
(3)
 Since 
previous research suggests that individuals may not respond optimally to the risks of natural and 
man-made disasters, it is especially important to study the quality of organizational responses, 
since they may be crucial to compensating for the frailty of individual choice.   
Preliminary evidence suggests that an organizational risk manager is important in disaster 
planning,
(4)
 but there is no empirical evidence (to our knowledge) that having a designated risk 
manager leads to the adoption of risk-reducing measures in organizations. Additionally, 
researchers have extensively studied risk perception at the individual level.
(5-7)
 However, there is 
limited research on the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of risk-reducing 
measures at the organizational level. Against the backdrop of a lack of empirical evidence in 
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these two lines of research, the goal of this study is to empirically answer two research questions. 
(1) “Does having a risk manager in an organization predict the adoption of risk-reducing 
measures?” (2) “What is the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of risk-
reducing measures at the organizational level?”  
To answer this question, we use data collected from a sample of public, private, and non-
profit organizations in the Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee in 2006. The results suggest 
that risk managers do matter when it comes to reducing the risks faced by organizations. More 
importantly, the results show that organizations with risk managers adopted more of both active 
and passive risk-reducing measures than organizations without risk managers. As expected, the 
results also indicate that risk perception is a significant predictor of risk-reducing measures. Our 
study adds to a small but growing literature on how organizations perceive risks and respond to 
them.
(8-13)
  
The following section discusses relevant literature on risk perception at the individual and 
organizational levels. We then present our methodology and data collection procedures. Next, we 
present the results, discuss the implications of the results, and offer some policy 
recommendations. Finally, we conclude by highlighting the limitations of our study and outlining 
an agenda for future research in risk reduction at the organizational level.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Disasters and Organizations 
 
One of the fundamental goals of organizations is survival.
(14)
 Survival is so important that 
organizational theorists have devoted much time to studying how organizations manage to 
survive.
(15)
 Disasters constantly threaten this goal by causing organizational disruption,
(16)
 loss of 
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sales and property taxes,
(17)
 and loss of services from public organizations and nonprofits, 
consequently, undermining the economy and support systems of communities.
(16)
 For example, 
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on colleges and universities in the Gulf Coast area was severe – 
it resulted in temporary closures at Tulane University, Dillard University, and Loyola University 
New Orleans.
(18)
 In fact, between 2005 and 2006, Tulane University, Xavier University, and 
Loyola University New Orleans lost more than 10 percent, 12 percent, and 26 percent in 
revenues, respectively, as a result of Hurricane Katrina.
(18)
 In addition, a survey conducted after 
Hurricane Katrina by the Mississippi Center for Nonprofits indicated that 67 percent of nonprofit 
organizations in the Biloxi-Pascagoula metro area suffered losses of paid staff members or 
volunteer staff, 77 percent reported total building loss or major building damage, and 93 percent 
reported losses of programs or services.
(19)
 The impacts of Hurricane Katrina on organizations 
are at the extreme end of a long continuum of losses attributable to various disasters.  
The challenge for organizations is to find ways of ensuring continuity during and after 
disasters. Organizations stand a better chance of surviving disasters and continuing their day-to-
operations if they have preparedness and mitigation strategies in place before disasters strike.
(20)
 
The unit of analysis in this study is the organization because organizations are an important 
decision-making unit in the community and they may be able to compensate for some of the 
well-known deficiencies in individual perception and management of risks. Furthermore, if 
organizational risk perception and management is plagued by similar deficiencies, then one 
cannot expect organizations to overcome frailties in personal or household decision making 
about risk.  
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2.2. Disaster Research at the Organizational Level 
 
Although there is a large body of research on disasters conducted at the individual, 
household, and community levels, little research has been conducted at the organizational 
level.
(21, 22)
 Fortunately, a small body of pre-disaster research at the organizational level is 
beginning to emerge due to the foundational work of Quarantelli, Lawrence, Tierney, and 
Johnson.
(23)
 These researchers examined how chemical companies and government agencies in 
18 U.S. communities plan for chemical emergencies.
(23)
 After this foundational study, other 
researchers have conducted organizational level studies. In fact, a few years after this 
foundational study, Drabek
(24-27)
 investigated how businesses in the tourism industry carry out 
evacuation planning and Mileti et al.
(28)
 studied how 54 businesses in eight San Francisco 
counties adopt earthquake preparedness measures. Furthermore, Barlow
(29)
 investigated the 
impact of Iben Browning earthquake prediction on 20 businesses in the St. Louis area and 
Dahlhamer and D’ Souza(30) investigated the determinants of business disaster preparedness in 
Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee and Des Moines/Polk County, Iowa. Finally, Webb et al.
(22)
 
examined the preparedness and disaster experiences of businesses in different parts of the 
country, including Memphis, Tennessee. More recently, other organizational level studies have 
emerged.
(4, 11, 13, 31-34)
 Despite the emergency of this latest crop of research on mitigation and 
preparedness at the organizational level, more organizational studies are needed.  
 
2.3. Determinants of Mitigation and Preparedness (Risk-Reducing) Measures 
 
2.3.1. Risk Manager 
 
An organizational risk manager is defined in this study as a designated employee (full-
time or part-time) charged with designing, adopting and/or implementing a wide range of risk 
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management programs. The risk manager assesses organizational vulnerability to disasters and 
communicates potential risks and planned responses to organizational members through videos, 
pamphlets and e-mails.
(35)
 Prior studies have established the important roles risk managers play 
in managing the risks faced by organizations.
(4)
 Others have examined the roles of risk managers 
in corporations.
(35)
  
While organizations may hire risk managers with the expectation that they will adopt 
risk-reducing measures and, consequently, reduce their organizations’ risks from both man-made 
hazards (e.g., terrorist attacks and chemical spills) and natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes and 
tornadoes), the expectation may not become reality. Risk managers may be too dislocated from 
the core functions of the organization to exert a significant influence. Moreover, if employees 
and core-business managers have low risk perceptions, it may be difficult for the risk manager to 
raise perceptions enough in the organization to support implementation of measures to reduce 
risk. And risk managers, even if present, may lack the necessary resources (including leadership 
support) to effectuate change. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence that 
having a risk manager leads to the adoption of risk-reducing measures. 
 
2.3.2. Risk Perception at the Organizational Level 
 
Some researchers have examined risk perception at the household
(36)
 and organizational 
levels.
(33)
 However, most previous research on risk perception has focused on individual risk 
perception and how risk perception relates to individual choice and then contributes to societal 
conceptions of acceptable risk.
(5, 6)
 With regard to the type of risks, previous researchers have 
studied risk perception of technological risks,
(37)
 environmental or natural hazards,
(38-41)
 and a 
combination of the two.
(42)
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2.3.3. Organizational Size 
 
Researchers have found that larger organizations are more likely to mitigate and prepare 
for disasters than smaller organizations.
(23-27, 32)
 In fact, research has shown that, among a variety 
of independent variables that have been tested, firm size is the most consistent
(30)
 and 
important
(22)
 predictor of organizational mitigation and preparedness. The most straightforward 
interpretation as to why larger firms devote more to disaster mitigation and preparedness than do 
smaller firms is that larger firms have more resources available to them.
(28, 30, 43)
 Resource 
availability has been found to be a significant predictor at the organizational level, as well as the 
household
(44)
 and community
(45, 46)
 levels. But firm size may also act merely as a surrogate for a 
variety of other variables that are difficult to measure (e.g., planning horizon of executives, 
presence of professionalized boards of directors with a stake in the organization’s future, and so 
forth). 
 
2.3.4. Ownership Pattern 
    
In addition to size, there are differences in ownership patterns—whether the organization 
is a single firm or a franchise—with respect to the adoption of mitigation and preparedness 
measures. Empirical evidence suggests that franchises do more to mitigate and prepare for 
disasters than single firms. For instance, Drabek
(24-27)
 found that firms that were part of a larger 
chain engaged in more disaster evacuation planning than single firms did. This finding is in line 
with that of Quarantelli et al.,
(23)
 who found that national chemical companies engaged in more 
preparedness than single local chemical firms. Dahlhamer and D’Souza(30) provide an 
explanation for this finding by arguing that this difference may be due to the mandates given by 
corporate headquarters to local chapters to engage in disaster preparedness.  
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2.3.5. Organizational Sector  
 
Evidence in the disaster literature indicates that some sectors engage in more mitigation 
and preparedness than others. For instance, Drabek
(24, 27)
 found that there was a significant 
relationship between business type and disaster evacuation planning, with lodging businesses 
having more extensive disaster evacuation plans than restaurants, entertainment businesses, and 
firms in the travel industry. Similarly, in their study of 54 firms on preparedness for earthquakes 
in San Francisco, Mileti et al.
(28)
 found an indirect relationship between firm type and earthquake 
preparedness. Further, Dahlhamer and D’Souza(30) found that businesses in the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector, do more to prepare for disasters than businesses in other sectors. 
This finding may be explained by the higher degree of regulation and oversight in this sector,
(22)
 
though adequate measures of regulation and oversight have not yet been developed to test this 
hypothesis. 
 
2.3.6.  Concern about Disaster Impact 
 
A body of research on risk and disaster visualizations suggests that information on the 
potential impacts of disasters can motivate people to take steps to reduce their risks.
(47)
 In other 
words, a high level of concern about the impact of disasters may lead to greater engagement in 
preparedness activities.
(48)
 For example, Showalter’s(49) study of the effect of Iben Browning 
earthquake prediction found that concern over loss of life and personal injury was positively 
correlated with respondents’ willingness to engage in preparedness activities. 
 
2.3.7. Organizational obstacles  
 
Organizations must address both internal and external obstacles to disaster mitigation and 
preparedness. However, in this study, our focus is on internal obstacles to disaster mitigation and 
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preparedness, which we define as factors inside the organization, that inhibit the ability of 
organizations to mitigate and prepare for disasters. The internal obstacles considered in this study 
fall into three major categories; lack of information, lack of management and organizational 
members’ support, and lack of financial resources.  
The acquisition of information is an important ingredient to disaster preparedness
(50)
 
because it allows organizations to make choices about how to allocate resources toward 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It is also important that management and 
organizational members support the adoption of mitigation and preparedness measures. The 
policymaking process, where policy entrepreneurs must mobilize support for their issues, 
demonstrates this well.
(46, 51-53)
 Finally, a lack of financial resources is likely to reduce the ability 
of an organization to adopt disaster mitigation and preparation measures.
(54, 55)
 
 
2.3.8. Determinants not in our Study 
  
There are some determinants of organizational mitigation and preparedness that we did 
not have measures for in our study. One such determinant is previous experience. Barlow
(29)
 and 
Drabek
(25, 26)
 both found that previous experience with disasters positively predicted future 
preparedness for disasters. Another determinant is whether a business leases or owns the 
property where they operate. A study by Dahlhamer and D’Souza(30) found that businesses that 
owned their property engaged in more preparedness measures than businesses that leased their 
properties. Finally, the age of the organization was not considered in this study. Research in this 
area has been inconsistent; Drabek
(24)
 found that organizations that have been in existence for at 
least 6 years were more likely to have extensive disaster evacuation plans, while Quarantelli et 
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al.
(23)
 found that older chemical firms were less likely to prepare for disasters than newer 
chemical firms. 
2.4. Hypothesis 
 
The goal of this paper is to empirically answer two research questions. (1) “Does having 
a risk manager in an organization predict the adoption of risk-reducing measures?” (2) “What is 
the relationship between risk perception and the adoption of risk-reducing measures at the 
organizational level?” To answer these two questions, we offer and test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: An organization with a risk manager is more likely than an organization without a 
risk manager to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. 
H0: An organization with a risk manager is less likely than an organization without a 
risk manager to adopt mitigation and preparedness measures. 
 
H2: Organizational risk perception leads to the adoption of mitigation and preparedness 
measures. 
H0: Organizational risk perception does not lead to the adoption of mitigation and 
preparedness measures. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data Collection 
 
Data were collected from the Memphis/Shelby County area, Tennessee in 2006. One of 
the authors was a member of a research team that collected these data from a sample of public, 
private, and non-profit organizations. The research team began by conducting exploratory 
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interviews with 15 different organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee. Interviewees 
were asked open-ended questions about the type of actions their organizations had taken in 
respect to risk, as well at their attitudes toward hazard risk management and risk information. 
The interviews were conducted either in person or via telephone in the spring and summer of 
2006.  Each interview took approximately 30-60 minutes. Following those interviews, the 
research team processed the responses and returned them to the interviewees to verify accuracy. 
The results of the exploratory interviews were then used to develop the survey instrument 
utilized in phase two.  
In the fall of 2006, a survey was mailed to 733 organizations in Memphis/Shelby County, 
TN. The survey was in two parts; the first consisted of questions regarding risk issues in 
organizations and the actions organizations were taking to address risks, the second part 
contained questions about demographic information of the respondents. The survey was 
distributed using a stratified sampling technique. With the help of the Memphis Regional 
Chambers of Commerce, the research team queried an online reference service, ReferenceUSA, 
using “number of employees” as a key index variable to allow organizations of all sizes in the 
Memphis Metropolitan Area to be surveyed and represented in sufficient numbers. The 
categories ranged from no employees to over 9,999 employees. The research team re-categorized 
the number of employees into seven distinct categories (1-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-
499, and ≥ 500). From these categories, the research team randomly selected 100 organizations 
from each of the first six categories, all 101 organizations from the seventh category, and then 
added 32 utility companies in Memphis/Shelby County area for a total of 733 organizations.  
The survey was administered using a modification of Dillman’s total design method.(56) 
Using the letterhead of the University of Memphis, the team mailed a letter to each of the 733 
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organizations describing the study and seeking participation. Following this, the research team 
mailed the first batch of surveys and follow-up postcards. Then, a second batch of surveys was 
sent out. The survey was addressed to the owners and risk managers of these organizations. Of 
the 733 organizations, 227 returned the survey (response rate of 31 percent) and 10 declined to 
participate in the study, citing reasons such as, “business is not being fully operational” and “due 
to the private nature of our business”, among other reasons.  
 
3.2. Uniqueness of Data 
 
The data collected by the research team and used in this study is unique in two ways. 
First, most studies on disaster preparedness focus on specific hazards.
(44)
 Our data, however, 
contains information on mitigation and preparedness measures for multiple types of man-made 
and natural hazards. Secondly, very few researchers have collected data on organizational 
behavior in relation to disaster preparedness and mitigation measures. One reason for this is that 
organizations are wary about providing such information for fear of potential consequences of 
releasing such information.
(57)
 In sum, our data contain the information necessary to have a 
comprehensive understanding of risk reduction among Memphis/Shelby County organizations. 
 
3.3. Dependent Variables 
 
Risk-reducing measures. We operationalize risk-reducing measures by 10 disaster 
mitigation and preparedness activities (see Table I). We measure these activities by the question, 
“Has your organization engaged in any of these activities over the past year?” Respondents could 
either answer “yes” or “no”. We generate a 10-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .88) by summing 
together the responses for each organization. We also develop an alternative formulation of the 
10 mitigation and preparedness activities – active and passive measures to address disaster risks 
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(see Table I). Additionally, we add the active measures together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and 
the passive measures together (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83). Active measures are those activities 
that involve an organization actually doing something to address its risks, not just discussing 
which actions to take. Passive measures are activities that involve an organization simply 
discussing or mentioning risk-reducing measures to be taken. We assume that active measures 
are more capable of reducing the impacts of disasters on organizations than passive measures. As 
a result, organizations that adopt active hazard adjustments may stand a better chance of 
surviving disasters in comparison to those that only enact passive hazard adjustments.  
 
Table I. Active and Passive Risk-Reducing Measures 
 
Risk-Reducing Measures  
Active  
 
1. Attended disaster meetings/training courses outside 
your organization 
2. Held disaster-related workshops/training within your 
organization 
3. Arranged site visits by consultants or experts to better 
prepare for disasters 
4. Provided information to customers/members of the 
community on issues related to disasters 
5. Assessed or evaluated vulnerability to disasters or 
estimated potential losses from disasters 
6. Engaged in non-structural mitigation measures (e.g., 
securing computers) 
7. Engaged in structural mitigation measures (e.g., 
strengthening parts of a building) 
 
Passive  
 
1. Mentioned a potential disaster in an organizational 
meeting 
2. Discussed in an organizational meeting short-term 
responses to disasters 
3. Discussed in an organizational meeting long-term 
strategies for recovery from disasters 
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3.4. Independent Variables 
 
Presence of a risk manager – We measure this variable by asking the following question 
in the survey, “Does your organization have a risk manager?” Respondents could either answer 
“yes” or “no”. This independent variable is dichotomous, and so, we create a dummy variable – 
1 for organizations that have a risk manager and 0 for organizations that do not have a risk 
manager.  
Risk Perception – We measure this variable by asking the following question in the 
survey, “Using the thermometer scale below, please indicate the extent to which you perceive the 
following disasters are a worry for your organization”, on a scale of 100 (a great deal of worry), 
50 (moderate worry), and 0 (no worry at all). The survey contained 15 different disasters (Bird 
flu/pandemics, chemical spills, drought, earthquakes, extreme heat, extreme winds/tornadoes, 
fires, flooding, hurricanes, ice storms, severe storms, terrorist attacks, toxic releases, violent 
crimes, and water pollution). We create an index by adding together the responses for all 15 
disasters. The 15-item index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89. 
 
3.5. Control Variables 
 
We control for the following variables that the literature on risk reduction say are 
important predictors of risk-reducing measures – concern over disaster impacts, organizational 
obstacles, ownership patterns of organizations, organizational size, and organizational sector 
(education, health, and wholesale/retail trade sectors).   
Concern over Disaster Impact – We measure this variable by asking the following 
question in the survey, “Please indicate the extent to which the following disaster impacts might 
adversely affect your organization” (1=minor adverse impact and 5=major adverse impact). The 
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13 disaster impacts are: (i) damaged reputation, (ii) disruption in supplies or deliveries, (iii) 
inability to communicate with employees, (iv) inadequate number of employees, (v) loss of 
commercial goods, (vi) loss of customers, (vii) loss of data, (viii) loss of life, (ix) loss of life 
support (food, water, etc.), (x) loss relative to competitor’s loss, (xi) power outage, (xii) 
structural damage, (xiii) transportation disruption. We create an index, mean disaster impact, for 
this variable by adding together the values for all 13 disaster impacts (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) 
and dividing by 13. 
Organizational Obstacles – We measure this independent variable by the survey 
question, “Please indicate the extent to which the following statements are obstacles to disaster 
planning in your organization”: (a) lack of financial resources to prepare for disasters, (b) lack of 
support from upper-level management within your organization, (c) lack of support from mid-
and lower-level organizational members, (d) lack of information about the frequency and 
magnitude of disasters, (e) lack of convincing information about the potential impacts of 
disasters, (f) unclear organizational benefits from disaster planning and mitigation. The scale of 
the variables is 1 to 5 (minor to major obstacle). We develop an index, the mean of all the 
obstacles by adding together the values for all the obstacles (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) and 
dividing by six.  
Ownership Pattern – Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the 
information on whether an organization is a single firm or part of a franchise. 
Organizational Size – We operationalize this variable by the number of full-time 
employees in an organization. Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the 
information on organizational size. 
17 
 
Organizational Sector – Memphis Regional Chambers of Commerce provided the 
information on the sector which an organization belongs to. 
 
3.6. Statistical Analysis 
 
We assume that there are some organizations in our sample that are against the adoption 
of mitigation and preparedness measures and regard these organizations as having negative 
values for mitigation and preparedness measures. We also assume that there are some 
organizations in our sample that engaged in more than 10 mitigation and preparedness measures 
over the past year. For instance, some organizations might have stored water and food in addition 
to adopting all 10 mitigation and preparedness measures. We have restricted the sample by 
bounding the dependent variable between zero (lower limit) and 10 (upper limit). In other words, 
the dependent variable is censored from both left and right, meaning that one cannot observe 
organizations that are below zero or above 10.  
We estimate a Tobit regression to answer the two research questions. Tobit is the 
appropriate technique for analyzing censored samples because it will take in to account 
organizations that engage in negative and above 10 mitigation and preparedness measures. We 
also estimate an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression in order to compare the OLS results 
with the Tobit results. Finally, we estimate a Logit regression to understand the relationship 
between individual mitigation and preparedness measures and risk manager as well as between 
individual mitigation and preparedness measures and risk perception. Logit is appropriate in this 
case because of the binary nature of the responses (“yes” or “no”).  
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4. RESULTS 
 
According to Table II, organizations in our sample adopted an average of 4.7 out of 10 
risk-reducing measures. In addition, about 44 percent of organizations in our sample have a risk 
manager and about 56 percent do not have a risk manager. With regard to risk perception, the 
mean risk perception is about 457 out of a maximum of 1365. 
 
Table II. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Variable   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Risk-Reducing Measures 206  4.7427  3.2710  0  10 
Risk Manager   207  .4444  .4981  0  1 
Risk Perception   224  456.9018 285.3145 0  1365 
Single Location   218  .7798  .4153  0  1 
Employee Size   215  5.7860  2.0758  1  11 
Mean Disaster Impact  220  3.6426  .7615  1  5 
Mean Obstacle   212  2.5118  1.3729  0  5 
Educational Sector  225  .08  .2719  0  1 
Health Sector   225  .1556  .3632  0  1 
Whole Sale/Retail Sector 225  .1511  .3589    0  1 
 
Table III presents the results of the OLS and Tobit regressions. The results of the Tobit 
regression are similar to those of OLS; both models show that having a risk manager 
significantly increases the likelihood of adopting risk-reducing measures. Taking the OLS result 
as an example; holding all other variables constant, the presence of a risk manager leads to a 2.06 
increase in the number of risk-reducing measures adopted. The other variable of interest, risk 
perception, has a positive and significant relationship with the adoption of risk-reducing 
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measures in both models. Again, taking the OLS results as an example, holding all other 
variables constant, a unit increase in risk perception increases the number of risk-reducing 
measures adopted by 0.0017. Single location, mean obstacle, and wholesale/retail sector have 
negative and significant relationships with risk-reducing measures. In addition, employee size 
and educational sector have positive and significant relationships with risk-reducing measures.  
 
Table III. Ordinary Lease Square and Tobit Regression Results 
Variable OLS Tobit 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Risk Manager 2.0557*** 
(.3842) 
2.2243*** 
(.4640) 
Risk Perception .0017** 
(.0007) 
.0022** 
(.0009) 
   
Employee Size .4927*** 
(.0859) 
.5924*** 
(.1045) 
Single Location -1.3013***   
 (.4465) 
-1.5855*** 
(.5404) 
Mean Disaster Impact  -.0439   
 (.2564) 
-.1096 
(.3127) 
Mean Obstacle -.3681***   
(.1282) 
-.4195*** 
(.1556) 
Educational Sector 1.1815* 
(.6348) 
1.2820* 
(.7606) 
Health Sector .4678 
(.4737) 
.6820 
(.5662) 
Wholesale/Retail Sector -1.7014**    
(.4808) 
-2.2959*** 
(.6015) 
Constant 2.3222** 
(1.08612) 
1.9943 
(1.3142) 
Observations 
 
180 180 
Adj. R
2
 (Prob. > F = 0.0000) 
 
.5311  
Pseudo R
2
 (Prob. > Chi
2 
= 0.0000)  .1539 
***p < 0.01   **p < 0.05    *p < 0.1 
 
Table IV, which presents the results of the active and passive analysis indicates that there 
is a significant and positive relationship between having a risk manager and the adoption of both 
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active and passive measures. In addition, organizational risk perception leads to the adoption of 
both active and passive measures.  
The results of the 10 Logit regressions (see Table V in the Appendix) indicate that having 
a risk manager significantly increases the likelihood of adopting risk-reducing measures in all 
but two risk-reducing measures. Additionally, risk perception is a significant determinant of risk-
reduction in four of the 10 risk-reducing measures.  
 
Table IV. Logit Outputs for Active and Passive Measures 
Variable Active 
Measures 
Passive 
Measures 
 Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Risk Manager 1.7946***   
(.3488)   
1.2485* 
(.5092) 
Risk Perception .0016*   
(.0006) 
.0020*  
 (.0009) 
Single Location -.8298*  
(.4058) 
-1.7452**   
(.6114) 
Employee Size .4082***   
(.0795) 
.5435*** 
(.1178) 
Mean Disaster Impact -.0810    
(.2366) 
.0136 
 (.3341) 
Mean Obstacle -.3065**   
(.1171) 
-.3375**   
(.1712) 
Educational Sector .7143    
(.5697) 
1.0404  
(.8221) 
Health Sector -.1204    
(.4324) 
1.5089**   
(.6326) 
Whole Sale/Retail Sector -1.6900***   
(.6363) 
-1.6294**  
(.6384) 
Constant .8093**   
(.9925) 
-1.7082  
(1.3717) 
N 182 186 
Pseudo R2 (Prob. > Chi2 = 
0.0000) 
0.1614 0.1931 
***p < 0.01   **p < 0.05    *p < 0.1 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Hiring a risk manager comes with the expectation that a risk manager will help an 
organization to reduce its risks from natural and man-made hazards. In fact, Ward
(35)
 argues that 
risk managers are in charge of developing and implementing risk management programs within 
organizations. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study that empirically shows that hiring a 
risk manager leads to the adoption of risk-reducing measures. The results of our analyses provide 
empirical evidence to support the assertion that hiring a risk manager does, in fact, lead to the 
adoption of risk-reducing measures in organizations. Furthermore, hiring a risk manager is 
associated with the adoption of both active and passive measures. Our results also suggest that 
organizational risk perception leads to the adoption of risk-reducing measures. This result is in 
agreement with previous findings on risk perceptions.
(33)
 Finally, our result indicates that 
organizational risk perception is associated with the adoption of both active and passive 
measures.   
Our results are interesting because they suggest that risk managers make a big difference 
when it comes to adopting risk-reducing measures in organizations. And that risk managers are 
not just talking about risk reducing measures to adopt, but that they are also involved in more 
proactive measures that can actually reduce the impacts of disasters on organizations. The 
significant relationship between risk-reducing measures and the presence of risk managers in 
organizations leads us to recommend that organizations interested in reducing their risks should 
consider hiring a risk manager if they can afford it. For organizations who cannot afford to hire a 
risk manager, the federal, state, or local government should consider providing risk management 
services at no cost to such organizations with the ultimate goal of helping organizations reduce 
their disaster risks.  
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The significant and negative relationship between adoption of risk-reducing measures and 
organizational obstacles suggests that risk managers are confronted with some obstacles in their 
bid to reduce organizational risks. An appropriate recommendation in this regard might be for 
organizations to pay attention to these obstacles with the goal of reducing their impacts on the 
risk manager. If an organization is successful in doing so, the risk manager may be more 
effective at managing the organization’s risks from both man-made and natural disasters. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
For low-probability, high-consequence events that can impact entire organizations, it is 
important to understand organizational preparation for such events. In this study, risk-reducing 
measures are 10 mitigation and preparedness measures that could help to diminish organizations’ 
losses from natural and man-made disasters. The purpose of this study is to determine whether a 
designated risk manager is associated with a stronger portfolio of risk-reducing measures and 
whether organizational risk perception predicts the adoption of risk-reducing measures. The 
results are encouraging. They indicate that hiring a risk manager leads to the adoption of risk-
reducing measures and that a risk manager is associated with the adoption of both active and 
passive measures. In addition, the results show that organizational risk perception is associated 
with the adoption of risk-reducing measures. 
There are some limitations to our study. First, although we postulate that risk managers 
are a causative agent, it could be that the presence of a risk manager is endogenous, and is partly 
induced by the number of risk-reducing measure in the organization. In other words, 
organizations with lots of risk-reducing measures may be more likely to hire a risk manager than 
organizations with few risk-reducing measures. This is because the former have more resources 
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at stake in risk management than the latter. A much more complex research design – and 
possibly an experimental design – is necessary to resolve this matter. Second, because our study 
is based on Memphis/Shelby County region, our results may not be easily generalizable to other 
parts of the country. Third, our measure of “the presence of a risk manager” may not be accurate 
because some organizations might spread their risk management function across multiple jobs. If 
they do so, it is not clear that our survey instrument captured such arrangements. Fourth, we did 
not control for some variables that are significant determinants of risk-reduction like past disaster 
experience, age of the organization, and whether an organization leases or owns the business 
property where it operates.
(30, 44, 58)
 As a result, our analyses may suffer from some omitted 
variable bias.  
Despite these limitations, we are confident that our study adds to the small, but growing 
literature on organizational perception and management of risk. Future research should examine 
whether the type of risk manager matters (e.g., full-time versus part-time and placement within 
the organization) and whether the resources allocated to risk managers have an impact. By 
isolating which aspects of the risk manager’s role are most important, research can provide clues 
about how a culture of risk management may be infused in all units within their organizations.
(35)
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APPENDIX 
Table V. Logit Outputs for Individual Risk-Reducing Measures 
Variable Attend 
Meeting 
Mention 
Disaster 
Held Work 
Shops 
Short-term 
Response   
Long-
Term 
Recovery 
 Attend 
Meeting 
Provide 
Information 
Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Non-
Structural 
Mitigation 
Structural 
Mitigation 
Risk 
Manager 
1.1466***   
(.3978)   
.9053* 
(.4628) 
1.4906***  
(.4243) 
.5826   
(.4529) 
.8980**   
(.4091) 
1.9044***   
(.4457) 
.8940**   
(.4006) 
1.4388***   
(.4021) 
.3784   
(.3669) 
.9651** 
(.4157) 
Risk 
Perception 
.0019**   
(.0008) 
.0006   
(.0008) 
.0021**   
(.0009) 
.0011  
(.0008) 
.0019** 
(.0008) 
.0012  
(.0008) 
.0020**  
(.0008) 
.0006   (.0007) -.0007  
(.0007) 
.0008   
(.0008) 
Single 
Location 
-.3678   
(.4887) 
-1.3468**   
(.5864) 
-.7334   
(.5293) 
-1.7111***    
(.6120) 
-1.0903**   
(.5347) 
-.9303*   
(.4879) 
-.5686  
(.4490) 
-.6832  
(.4934) 
-.6206   
(.4375) 
-.1269  
(.4704) 
Employee 
Size 
.3926***   
(.0991) 
.3050*** 
(.0985) 
.4230***  
(.1068) 
.4630***  
(.1034) 
.4280***  
(.1053) 
.2614**  
(.1049) 
.0372  
(.0937) 
.1800**  
(.0910) 
.2662***   
(.0823) 
.1652*  
(.0983) 
Mean 
Disaster 
Impact 
-.0696   
(.2859) 
.1917   
(.2872) 
-.3686  
(.3097) 
.0431  
(.2924) 
-.1744   
(.2975) 
-.1140  
(.3065) 
-.1275  
(.2878) 
-.1364   
(.2758) 
.2991   
(.2451) 
-.1058  
(.2810) 
Mean 
Obstacle 
-.2336*   
(.1411) 
-.0386   
(.1510) 
-.4501***  
(.1565) 
-.2062   
(.1527) 
-.4196***   
(.1515) 
-.3017**  
(.1515) 
-.0581   
(.1389) 
-.1343   
(.1359) 
-.0454  
(.1231) 
-.3943***  
(.1457) 
Educational 
Sector 
.4758   
(.6569) 
.8398  
(.8491) 
.4712   
(.6785) 
.6877  
(.7480) 
.5658   
(.6396) 
.1319   
(.6304) 
1.8633***    
(.6732) 
.9558   (.8389) .2246   
(.6025) 
-.4782   
(.6452) 
Health Sector .5528   
(.5268) 
1.2505**   
(.6244) 
.4320   
(.5649) 
1.4095**   
(.6209) 
  .5533   
(.5382) 
-.5896   
(.5952) 
-.6852   
(.5531) 
-.2515    
(.4888) 
.4233  
(.4685) 
-.7021   
(.5570) 
Whole 
Sale/Retail 
Sector 
-1.4182**   
(.6363) 
-1.2381**  
(.5279) 
-2.0194***     
(.7499) 
-.5296   
(.5378) 
-2.0163***   
(.7540) 
-.8842   
(.7205) 
-1.2010*   
(.6849) 
-1.6554***   
(.5546) 
-.4156  
(.4618) 
-1.5905**  
(.8037) 
Constant -2.6412**   
(1.2230) 
-.9086  
(1.1940) 
-1.1712   
(1.2333) 
-.8989  
(1.1898) 
-1.4578   
(1.2131) 
-2.2035*   
(1.2629) 
-1.3924    
(1.1478) 
 
.0635    
(1.1480) 
-1.5688  
(.9973) 
-1.2945  
(1.1265) 
***p < 0.01              **p < 0.05           * p < 0.1 
 
 
